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Katharina Weghmann
1 The cultural context, the steps to our bill, the principles and news
2 by  Nicole-Marie  Meyer  Anti-corruption  expert  for  Transparency  International
(international secretary), Project manager for Transparency International France 
3 Transparency International  is  the global  civil  society organization leading the fight
against corruption.
4 Transparency International global campaign aims to strengthen whistleblowers rights
for employees and promote whistleblowing as an effective means to expose and fight
corruption. We contributed to introduce the article 33 in the UN Convention Against
Corruption  (UNCAC,  2003),  we  wrote  with  the  GRECO  and  dedicated  whistleblower
foundations (FAIR, GAP, Public Concern at Work, ODAC) International Principles for
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whistleblower legislation1 (part of the soft law [2009-2013]), we published the report
Whistleblowing  in  Europe  (2013)2,  which  prepared  the  EU  Recommendation  of  the
Committee of Ministers (2014), 7 to member States on the protection of whistleblowers
(30 April 2014)3.
5 France is a latecomer about whistleblowing, as we did not have any legislation till a
provision for the private sector in 2007, or any real public debate or knowledge about
the matter till 2013. One explanation is that our labour law gives a strong protection to
the workers, including harassment and discrimination, - we don’t have the “at will”
employment system- ; other explanations are cultural (a former nazi-occupied country,
a  catholic  country,  a  kingly  public  service,  a  popular  acceptance  to  the  fraud,
protection of personal data, privacy and dignity). Furthermore, whistleblowing systems
were  first  seen  around  2005  by  trade-unions  as  “exogenous”,  imported  from  USA
through the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) to the detriment of the trade unions and to
the advantage of investors. The cultural context is important to adopt or implement
legislation.
6 But  in  the  occidental  context  of  public  interest  and  individual  responsibility
disintegration, a social and corporate demand for ethics, business ethics and corporate
social responsibility slowly increased in the 20 last years. It did more recently tend to a
discursive then stronger will of a renovated political life. Increase of public scandals
(AZF,  Madoff,  Kerviel,  Mediator),  Transparency  International  France  reports  and
advocacy since 20044, and some charismatic French scientists whistleblowers like Irene
Frachon or foreign whistleblowers like Snowden led very recently to change the image
of the whistleblower from negative till 2010 into ambivalent after 2010, into positive in
2016. Never forget nevertheless that the main actors in France of this change were first
scientists  whistleblowers5,  who  fought  since  the  years  1970  and  founded  in  2002  a
charity  (Fondation Sciences  Citoyennes),  then TI  France advocacy and coordination
with this charity, then together with more and more NGOs and actors - including trade-
unions  and  the  government,  till  a  bill  for  a  stand-alone  legislation  pending  on
Parliament  on  29  March  20166. I  would  think  that  the  role  of  Transparency
International  France  was  to  provide  words  (a  positive  French  vocabulary),  tools,
projects and strategy, and gather together the good wills.
7 How and why did we manage it ? As a former French civil  servant,  Director of five
French  Institutes,  I  twice  gave  confidential  reports  to  my  managers  on  financial
wrongdoings – once on suspicion of embezzlement,  once on forgery and the use of
forgeries – that was my professional duty. The first time I was threatened with death
from the presumed wrongdoer, threatened with disciplinary sanctions by my ministry
and transferred to a much lower post. The second time I lost my job and career7. So I
made the first French test-case as civil servant cum maxima laude from the judges, got
apologies  from  my  ministry  and  even  a  promise  of  reinstatement.  But  I  was  not
reinstated because we had no such legislation. In the absence of a law, reinstatement
depends only on political will.
8 So I discovered unwillingly French legislative loopholes and whistleblowing. I joined
Transparency  International  France  as  a  volunteer,  created  its  whistleblowing
department in 2009. The first step was to collect and translate dedicated provisions in
the international and European conventions, that France did ratify but not apply ; the
second step and first fight regarding public opinion was and is always the language and
definitions (positive words for a positive perception) ; the third step was to find the
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rights  concepts  in  the  French  context  and  law.  So  we  worked  on  vocabulary  and
concepts,  studied  and  gathered  international  and  foreign  legislations  and  best
practices,  worked with the TI  -  International  Secretariat  on the 2009 Principles  for
Whistleblowing legislation, wrote the first French report on the subject8, and brought
together French whistleblowers and NGOs. With Transparency International France I
fought  for  five  years  and together  we  succeeded -  because  on  December  6th  2013,
France passed a law that protects the disclosure of offences and crimes in the public
and private sectors. In fact this year 2013, France passed three laws with whistleblower
provisions,  following  two  public  scandals  but  mainly  because  civil  society  and
Transparency France were ready - ready with concepts, tools and recommendations to
help the government. Ready when the legislative window opened itself. (As you know,
when the legislative window opens itself,  it  can be very short).  Moreover I  had the
incredible fortune to send my report on Whistleblowing in France to the government
(Cabinets,  General  Inspectors)  in  January  2013 :  in  February  the  scandal  revolving
around former Budget Minister Jerome Cahuzac compelled our government to propose
anticorruption  bills.  We  recommended  whistleblower  provisions,  and  became
correspondent of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet and other Cabinets.
9 So in the last three years, we had in parallel five whistleblower provisions adopted in
five laws by the Parliament, a growing coordination of NGOs and trade-unions and a
training of the government about whistleblower legislation, in the context of growing
international major scandals. We gathered 20 NGOs and trade-unions on the basis of
three bills : a stand-alone dedicated legislation, an independent authority, and a House
for the Whistleblowers.
10 In 2015, we wrote with two other NGOs (Anticor and Sciences Citoyennnes) and three
Academics  (Jean-Philippe  Foegle,  Marie-Angèle  Hermitte,  Laure  Romanet)  a  stand-
alone whistleblower bill (with a chapter for an independent authority), then reviewed
it with a socialist member of Parliament, the deputy Yann Galut. We started from our TI
Principles  and  the  Recommendation  of  the  Council  of  Europe2014,  studied  the  six
criteria  of  the  European  Court  of  Human Rights  test-cases  under  Article  10  of  the
Convention, studied the UK PIDA and eleven other stand-alone legislations and wrote
our bill as follow :
11 - One comprehensive stand-alone dedicated legislation for public and private sector 
12 - A broad definition coming from the Council of Europe : the report or disclosure of
information on “crimes, offences, threat or harm to the public interest, in the context
of their work-based relationship, whether it be in the public or private sector, past or
present, paid or not ” 
13 - Internal and external safe avenues to report wrongdoings with a graduated 2 steps
and not 3 steps (tree-tiers) channels model as PIDA : 1/ internal channel or external
channel  -  regulator  (regulator  or  member  of  Parliament),  2/  external  channel  that
means civil society and media 
14 - Reversed burden of proof (the burden of proof is shifted to the employer), coming also
from French harassment or discrimination legislation 
15 - Broad protection against any retaliation, including an “Interim relief” and the full
reparation of damages (without limit) plus reinstatement 
16 - No contracting out of Act : This Act has effect despite any provision to the contrary in
any agreement or contract 
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17 - The costs of proceedings shall be bore by the State 
18 - Criminal penalties for obstructing report or disclosure and for retaliation against the
whistleblower 
19 -  An  independent  Agency  to  receive,  handle  and  follow-up  whistleblower  reports,
investigate and regularly evaluate and publish related data.
20 We  did  also  last  year  work  with  NGOs  on  the  prefiguration  of  the  House  of
Whistleblowers (to provide free and confidential advice to victims, and assist them with
legal proceedings), and Transparency International France contributed to the report of
the Council  of  State to the Prime Minister9 about our whistleblower legislation and
recommendations to the government. Our NGO-Galut bill was presented on 29 March,
the government made a public declaration to the press on 30 March that they would
adopt a stand-alone statute for the public and private sectors, and the Council of State
presented its report to the Prime Minister on 13 April 2016.
21 Among the recommendations of the Council of state, the positive ones :
22 - Make uniform all the sectorial texts 
23 -  Obligation  of  whistleblower  channel  and  procedure  for  the  public  service  (plus
recommendation of whistleblower channel for the private sector as good practice) 
24 - Protection against retaliation through our Ombudsman, including an interim relief 
25 - Reinstatement of the civil servant or the employee dismissed because of a disclosure 
26 - Right of tort in case of abusive slander trials.
27 Our doubts and reserves about the Report :
28 - A definition limited to violations of the law and serious risks for public health or
safety and environment 
29 -  A  graduated  four  tiers  channels  model :  1/  hierarchy,  2/  internal  channel,  3/
regulator, 4/ civil society.
30 So with our NGOs coordination, we decided to push so that the maximum of our bill
Galut would enter into the government proposal on transparency of economic life so
called Sapin 210, through advocacy and a petition online today11. If the best would still
be  a  stand-alone  legislation  -  it  means  the  Galut  bill,  nevertheless  regarding  the
parliament calendar and mostly the 2017 presidential elections, the only chance that
remains to adopt an effective whistleblower statute in France before 2017 is this bill of
the minister Michel Sapin. Let us hope the long civil society fight for this purpose will
succeed.
31 The progressive recognition of whistleblowing policies,  the situation of France
and other countries in the evaluations conducted by GRECO and perspectives 
32 by Christophe Speckbacher, Head of Section in the Secretariat of the Group of States
against corruption (GRECO) of the Council of Europe.
33 I  will  address in my intervention the context of  anti-corruption efforts which have
contributed to the progressive recognition of whistleblowing policies, the situation of
France and other countries in the evaluations conducted by GRECO and before finally
making a couple of general prospective remarks.
34 I The subject of whistleblowing in the context of the fight against corruption.
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35 First  of  all,  the  subject  of  whistleblowing  has  been  an  important  element  in  the
definition of anti-corruption policies by the Council of Europe since their inception in
1994,  on  the  occasion  of  the  Conference  of  Ministers  of  Justice  meeting  in  Valetta
(Malta). Why is that so ? Because corruption refers to criminal acts which are by nature
eminently secretive.
36 Between 1997 and 2003, the Council of Europe adopted six international instruments
which aim to cover both the preventive and repressive aspects of corruption in a broad
range of  situations,  whether domestic  or cross-border including in connection with
political financing. The subject of whistleblowing appears to various degrees in three of
these texts.
37 First of all, the Civil Law Convention on Corruption of 199912 establishes under article 9
that “Each Party shall provide in its internal law for appropriate protection against any
unjustified sanction for employees who have reasonable grounds to suspect corruption
ad who report in good faith the suspicion to responsible persons or authorities”.
38 France is one of the countries which have ratified this Convention.
39 The second text I should like to mention is the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,
also from 1999, which was also ratified by France. Article 22 is not strictly related to
what we understand as “whistleblowing” but it addresses a mechanism which can be
seen  as  a  prolongation  thereof,  namely  the  judicial/police  protection  of  reporting
persons and witnesses “Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to
provide effective and appropriate protection for :  (a) Those who report the criminal
offences established in accordance with articles 2 to 14 [active and passive bribery in
the  public  and  private  sector,  trading  in  influence,  money  laundering,  account
offences] or otherwise cooperate with the investigating or prosecuting authorities ; (b)
Witnesses who give testimony concerning these offences.
40 Whereas the previous form of protection is normally meant to offer safeguards to the
whistleblower in his/her professional environment, this second form of protection may
be needed at a later stage, if the whistleblower is to become a witness and where the
circumstances of the case are such that the person is actually facing risks for his/her
personal integrity.
41 It is often ignored that a third anti-corruption instrument of the Council of Europe
contains  an  element  of  whistleblowing  and  that  is  the  Committee  of  Ministers’
Recommendation  (2000)4  on  Codes  of  conduct  for  public  officials.  It  encourages
countries to adopt codes of conduct for the public sector and it contains in annex a
model code which can easily be adapted and transposed at national level. Article 12 of
the  model  code  refers  to  the  reporting  of  matters  of  concern  such  as  illegitimate
hierarchical orders, breaches of the code, criminal misconduct relating to the public
service  concerned.  In  that  context,  it  provides  for  a  general  protection  under
paragraph 6 :
42 Article 12 Reporting :
43 1. The public official who believes he or she is being required to act in a way which is unlawful,
improper or unethical,  which involves maladministration,  or which is  otherwise inconsistent
with this Code, should report the matter in accordance with the law.
44 2. The public official should, in accordance with the law, report to the competent authorities if he
or she becomes aware of breaches of this Code by other public officials.
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45 3. The public official who has reported any of the above in accordance with the law and believes
that the response does not meet his or her concern may report the matter in writing to the
relevant head of the public service.
46 4. Where a matter cannot be resolved by the procedures and appeals set out in the legislation on
the public service on a basis acceptable to the public official concerned, the public official should
carry out the lawful instructions he or she has been given.
47 5.  The public  official  should report  to  the  competent  authorities  any evidence,  allegation or
suspicion of unlawful or criminal activity relating to the public service coming to his or her
knowledge in the course of,  or arising from, his or her employment. The investigation of the
reported facts shall be carried out by the competent authorities.
48 6. The public administration should ensure that no prejudice is caused to a public official who
reports any of the above on reasonable grounds and in good faith.
49 Up until now, GRECO - which has carried out four evaluation rounds - has considered
institutional aspects of anti-corruption policies and the public sector as the top priority
for its work. But the 1999 conventions mentioned above refer to whistleblowers both in
the public and in the private sector ; only the Recommendation from 2000 is specifically
concerned with the public sector. At some stage in future maybe GRECO’s 49 member
States will want to deal also with policies and measures concerning business and the
private sector.
50 II- What has GRECO said about France up to now ?
51 Unfortunately, this dates back to several years ago, when GRECO examined and adopted
the First Round evaluation report in 2001.13
52 The comments  which were made on that  occasion were triggered by the “famous”
article  40  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  which  requires  civil  servants  to  report
suspicions of crime to criminal law bodies. It was presented by France as one of the
main tools for the revelation of corruption-related acts. France made it clear that this
provision places a reporting duty also on individuals,  not just the employing public
body and that a public employee can report directly the matter to the prosecutor or
police without following the preliminary hierarchical route. Because article 40 of the
Criminal Procedure Code establishes a duty to report, officials who make use of this
provision are protected by law. But the discussions on-site, including with NGOs and
academics, also revealed that the reality was different, that individuals concerned were
not eager to report for fears of retaliation and that as a result, only few reports were
being made. Practice also showed that even if one subsequently obtains redress before
the administrative courts because of an unfair or illegal dismissal, it can easily take a
few years for the case to become final. This does not amount to an adequate incentive
or protective mechanism for whistleblowers of course.
53 So in  2001,  GRECO issued two recommendations  to  improve  the  existing  system of
whistleblowing under article 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code :
54 - to consider the development of new enforcement methods and at least ensure that
there is a procedure for interviewing whistle-blowers and other witnesses who choose
to remain anonymous or whose identity is known only to the competent magistrate
and  otherwise  remains  secret.  Persons  who  agree  to  co-operate  with  the  judicial
authorities should also be entitled to specific forms of protection 
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55 - to remind government departments and all other public agencies of the existence and
content of Article 40, paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and take steps to
facilitate its use without hindrance in corruption cases 
56 III- How did countries compare with each other ?
57 GRECO analyzed  more  systematically  whistleblowing  policies  –  including  protective
measures  –  in  the  public  sector  in  the  context  of its  second  evaluation  round
(2003-2006) and the subsequent corresponding compliance procedure. This round dealt
inter allia with preventive measures in the administration. Around 2009, I wrote an
updated paper on the horizontal findings of all GRECO reports in the second round with
regard  to  whistleblowing14.  It  emerged  that  more  than  half  of  the  GRECO  member
countries have had gaps in that area and had been required by GRECO to introduce
whistleblowing policies.  Among these, a majority of countries had adopted rules,  or
were in the process of doing so. Sometimes, interesting approaches have been found.
For instance, Portugal introduced a system involving a reversal of the burden of proof
whereby  it  is  for  the  employer  to  demonstrate  that  any  measure  applied  to  the
detriment of a whistleblower does not come as a form of retaliation connected with a
report that she (or he) has made.
58 In many cases, it took quite a while for the countries concerned to make changes and
during the compliance procedure, we still heard some objections from countries which
tried  to  avoid  making  the  necessary  reforms,  arguing  that  trade  unions,  witness
protection or anti-money laundering preventing (reporting) requirements constituted
some sort of alternative arrangements and that specific rules on whistleblowing were
not needed. GRECO usually disagreed with this.
59 IV- Perspectives
60 Policies on whistleblowing are progressively developing and becoming more common
both in the public and in the private sector. I see two series of factors for this.
61 First of all, we have of course the “push” from the International Community and the
work done by such organizations as the Council of Europe, as seen earlier.
62 Secondly,  these  policies  are  increasingly  becoming  a  component  of  risk-based
management  and  compliance  programmes  -  including  on  corruption  prevention  -
introduced by private organizations, and progressively also public organizations. This
is supported by the generalization and dissemination of new management methods,
including through the input from external consultancy. In my view, this trend in recent
years is  a  consequence of  the increasing and sometimes highly mediatized lawsuits
against legal entities. All of you are probably familiar with the mechanisms that allow
to  hold  legal  entities  to  account  for  criminal  acts  including  corruption.  Many
international instruments dealing with crime issues require state parties to provide for
the liability of legal persons. This liability mechanism is based on the principle that the
absence of appropriate internal policies to prevent criminal acts committed by natural
persons acting on behalf of the entity shall be considered as an element of proof for the
guilt of the entity. The media have given broad coverage to examples of such cases in
the  United  States,  Germany  and  few  other  countries.  There  is  thus  an  increasing
incentive  for  companies,  especially  the  bigger  ones,  to  introduce  such  policies
requiring inter alia the disclosure of matters of concern (at least to the management),
and  making  it  clear  that  whistleblowers  should  not  be  sanctioned  for  filing  such
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reports.  Business  entities  are  thus  dealing  increasingly  with  legal,  commercial  and
reputational risks inherent to a possible lawsuit in case of a criminal conduct.
63 Overall, I have the feeling that, in recent years, the private sector has progressively
been catching up with the public sector when it comes to integrity policies, even to the
extent that in turn, the latter is now drawing inspiration from the former. If I take the
example of my own organization, the Council of Europe, we can see the progressive
development of  reporting and whistleblowing policies,  albeit  limited to the specific
context of corruption and fraud, and more recently of a risk-management policy.
64 Taking  Whistleblower  Protection  to  the  Next  Level :  Legal  Mechanisms  to
Encourage Organizations to Be More Ethical 
65 Dr.  Katharina  Weghmann,  Executive  Director  at  EY  -  Fraud  Investigation  & Dispute
Services  and  lecturer  at  Witten/Herdecke  University,  Germany  and  Dr.  Marc  Le
Menestrel,  Associate  Professor  of  Management  (Universitat  Pompeu  Fabra),  Visiting
Professor of Ethics (INSEAD), Senior Associate, (The University of Cambridge, Institute
for Sustainability Leadership)
66 The Council of Europe (COE) recommends that there is a serious need for analyzing and
optimizing  the  legal  protection  of  public  and  corporate  whistleblowers  (Council  of
Europe, 2014).
67 There seems to be consent that legislation for the protection of whistleblowers needs to
be urgently updated.
68 Findings of empirical research in this field seems to strengthen this position due to the
alarming notion that whistleblowers tend to be vilified and ostracized for speaking up
and  hence,  suffer  tremendous  consequences  -  personally  and  professionally  (i.e.
Parmerlee, 1982 ; Miceli, M. P. et al, 2008 ; Alford, 2001 ; Weghmann, 2014).
69 In theory, whistleblowing represents a vital mechanism in democracies to regulate the
abuse of power in governments and organizations (Dozier and Miceli 1985 ; Glazer and
Glazer, 1989 ; Miceli et al. 2008 ; Ensign, 2015).
70 In practice however, we seem to punish whistleblowers for their service and send a
message of them being a threat.
71 This perception becomes particularly clear when perpetrators, on the other hand, are
not being held accountable as we have seen in the recent financial crisis (Taibbi, 2011 ;
Eisinger, 2014 ; Cohan, 2015).
72 Moving forward,  we agree  that  it  is  imperative  to  optimize  the  legal  protection of
whistleblowers.
73 At the same time, we argue in this paper that it is also a matter of proper enforcement
of our existing laws to improve our current system.
74 More importantly, - to protect whistleblowers sustainably and effectively - we suggest
creating  legal  mechanisms  that  encourage  organizations  to  protect  whistleblowers
internally by cultivating a strong culture of speaking up.
75 With this proposal, we advocate for both a systemic and behavioral approach, which is
aimed at inspiring policy makers to go beyond the mere protection of whistleblowers.
76 We want to support policy makers to see their role in a broader light that can positively
shape corporate behavior by creating a landscape in which organizations are motivated
to be more ethical and promote speaking up.
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77 We  propose  our  systemic  approach  as  an  alternative  to  some  of  the  recent
developments.
78 For  instance,  while  the  United-States  seem  progressive  in  terms  of  whistleblower
protection, the vilification of whistleblowers appears to intensify on an organizational
level.
79 Instead of  cultivating cultures of  speaking up,  many organizations have adapted to
stronger  whistleblower  protection  which  paradoxically  makes  whistleblowing  even
harder for  employees,  which is  now known as pretaliation (Ensign,  2015 ;  Wilmoth,
2015).
80 Also, so-called “bounty programs” as implemented by the SEC seem to have side effects.
81 The bounty programs appear to be inefficient (Eaglesham and Ensign, 2015) and more
importantly, can create a notion of mistrust and competition.
82 Therefore,  we  strongly  advice  for  a  more  systemic  and  innovative  approach  to
whistleblower protection.
83 In order to fulfill this premise, we propose analyzing the rationale of organizations as
to why they would (or would not) protect whistleblowers by comparing their economic
and ethical rationality reasons.
84 To  inform  the  dialogue  and  development  of  legal  mechanisms,  we  juxtapose  two
hypothetical  organizational  positions  in  regards  to  whistleblowing :  One  common
perspective  seems  to  be  that  protecting  whistleblowers  appears  prima  facie  as  a
significant  risk  that  threatens  an  organization’s  operation,  processes,  and  profit
generation.
85 Taking into consideration the pressure from our global and hypercompetitive business
landscape,  one  can  fathom  the  default  reaction  to  silence  and  retaliate  against
whistleblowers if necessary - intentionally or not.
86 Meanwhile, the ability of a policy to uncover corporate attitudes of denial, justifications
and externalization of their locus of power appears to be crucial to raise awareness of
companies  of  their  reactive  and  unethical  (indirectly  or  not)  attitudes  towards
whistleblowers protection.
87 An alternative perspective for organizations could be to perceive whistleblowers as an
asset and therefore, invest in protecting them by building cultures of speaking up.
88 The argument for seeing whistleblowers as an asset is twofold. First, it is imperative to
see  whistleblowing  as  a  reflection  of  our  collective  values  in  democratic  societies
because  the  disclosure  of  behaviors  that  are  harmful  to  society  is  a  necessary
mechanism for the sustainability of our system.
89 Second, normalizing whistleblowing by successfully building organizational cultures of
speaking up can amp up the ethics game of organizations, which in turn can contribute
to the long term financial success of companies, even if such benefits cannot be fully
expected at the time of the decision.
90 Hence, instead of focusing on the short term financial loss whistleblowers may create,
we  suggest  that  organizations  should  consider  this  potential  financial  loss  as  an
investment that may pay off in the long run.
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91 When whistleblowing is normalized in organizations and issues are resolved internally,
organizations may in the long run improve their economic performance, reputation,
and social responsibility.
92 Such positive outcome, which might be too elusive as a dominating rational motivation
at the time of the decision, can nevertheless bring proactive companies to an ideal state
where they have done both : choose for what is ethical and eventually profitable.
93 In  a  nutshell,  we  invite  policy  makers  to  have  a  dialogue  on  taking  whistleblower
protection  to  the  next  level  by  enforcing  laws  more  rigorously,  and  creating
mechanisms that motivate and encourage organizations to treat whistleblowers as an
asset - not only because of economic interest but because of their ethical duty.
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France, 2010 ; L’alerte éthique ou whistleblowing en France, Nicole Marie Meyer, TI-SI, 2012, TI
France, janvier 2013.
5. La science asservie.  Santé publique :  les collusions mortifères entre industriels et chercheurs,  Annie
Thébaud-Mony, La Découverte, avril 2015. Among these whistleblowers, André Cicolella founder
of the charity FSC.
6. Proposition  de  loi  déposée  par  Yann  Galut,  Assemblée  Nationale,  29  mars  2016. http://
www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/documents/notice/14/propositions/pion3607/(index)/
propositions-loi.









12. Ed.  note :  the  instruments  mentioned  in  this  presentation  are  all  available  at  http://
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/instruments_en.asp.
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13. Ed. note : see http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/GrecoEval1
(2001)4_France_EN.pdf, paragraphs 129-132.
14. Ed note : This was an update of an earlier paper prepared by Mr Paul Stephenson (UK). For
the  original  paper,  see  http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/
Compendium_Thematic_Articles_EN.pdf and  for  the  update,  see  for  instance  http://
www.batory.org.pl/doc/Whistleblowing %20mechanisms %20REV2 %20for %20Batory
 %20Foundation %20Conf %20of %2030March09.pdf.
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